In the literature of recent years on international relations, considerable attention has been paid to the peculiarities of contradictions between imperialist states in modern conditions .1 The purpose of this article is to determine which historical factors significantly influence the comparative strength of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in the imperialist camp and what was the actual relationship between the two groups of contradictions at different times: inter - imperialist and between the two social systems.

The study of the main stages of the inter-imperialist struggle since the 70s of the XIX century provides a lot of material for a more thorough analysis of its features in the modern period.

V. I. Lenin clearly defined the time frame for the formation of the stage of monopolistic capitalism. Both from the point of view of the formation of monopolies and from the point of view of the seizure of colonies, the transition to the highest stage of capitalism dates back to the last three decades of the nineteenth century. At the beginning, its monopolies are "only barely noticeable germs", and at the end, "cartels become one of the foundations of all economic life". In the beginning, the colonial policy, as Lenin wrote, "could develop non-monopolistically in the form of, so to speak,' free-seizing ' land occupation, "since a significant part of the industrially undeveloped countries were not yet occupied by colonies. At the end of the period-the vast majority of these lands were captured and another era began - "monopoly possession of colonies and, consequently, a particularly acute struggle for the division and division of the world" 2 .

There was a direct economic relationship between the growth of industrial monopolies and the seizure of colonies. The first monopolies grew during a long period of economic stagnation that followed the crisis of 1873 and lasted until the mid-1890s. Not only was the old system of free competition collapsing. The sectoral structure of the economy has also undergone a profound breakdown. Thus, economic conditions determined the specifics of conquest and development

1 See: Gromyko A. A. External expansion of capital. Istoriya i sovremennost ' [History and Modernity], Moscow, 1982; Ivanov I. D. Mezhdunarodnye monopolii v vneshne politike imperializma, Moscow, 1981; Khalosha B. M. Voenno-politicheskie soyuzy imperializma, Moscow, 1982; Bunkina M. K., Motylev V. V. Protrusiya i konfliktsii sovremennogo kapitalisticheskogo khozyaistva, Moscow, 1983; Sabelnikov L. V. Voina bez peremiriya, Moscow, 1983; and etc.

2 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 27, pp. 317, 422.

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colonies in the last 30 years of the XIX century. These territories were captured primarily as special, promising sales markets and objects of emigration of "surplus" labor, which was of no small importance in the conditions of prolonged depression and a significant increase in unemployment in the leading capitalist countries.

By the beginning of the period under review, the monopoly of England as the industrial "workshop of the whole world"3 had been undermined . Other countries, primarily Germany and the United States, have become active competitors in the global market. On this basis, the pursuit of colonies unfolds, in which England itself participated, already having the largest colonial empire by that time. For England, this was a way to hide in the colonial markets from strong competitors, as well as a means to export to the colonies the burden of their internal socio-economic contradictions. As S. Rohde said, empire "is a question of the stomach. If you don't want a civil war, you must become imperialists."4 Other Western European countries, such as Japan and the United States, also participated in the pursuit of colonies. By the beginning of the period under review, the United States had bought Alaska and completed its takeover of the Far West, and by the end of the period, it had annexed the Hawaiian Islands and prepared to seize "foreign" possessions-Cuba and the Philippines.

So, the following features are characteristic of the inter-imperialist rivalry of that time:: 1) new imperialist states appeared on the scene, calling into question the former monopoly of England; 2) the struggle between them was mainly non-military in nature, since it resulted in the seizure of "free" lands.

* * *

At the beginning of the 20th century, inter-imperialist rivalry significantly intensified. The main fact that the largest capitalist states are now facing is the lack of" free " land for new seizures. But the need for economic territories not only remained, it increased significantly. This conflict ended with the First World War. Hence the time frame of the new period: 1900-1918.

The growing demand for colonies was determined both by the fact that monopolies had come to dominate and by the new period of accelerated industrial development in the leading capitalist countries. The rapidly growing new industries of this time-electrical and electrical engineering, chemistry, and military shipbuilding-were characterized by high material and capital intensity. The range of raw materials in which trusts were directly interested was expanding. The demand for liquid fuel, saltpeter, iron ore, and rubber grew rapidly. For the first time, the problem of shortage of mineral raw materials and fuel in industrialized countries was acute, and a feverish search for their sources outside their own territory began, and there was an acute interest in seizing them. Iran, Indonesia, and other backward countries that have become owners of huge underground storerooms have become targets of expansion for this very purpose. "The main feature of modern capitalism is the dominance of monopolistic unions of the largest entrepreneurs. Such monopolies are most solid, Lenin wrote, when all the sources of raw materials are seized in one hand.. The possession of a colony alone provides a complete guarantee of the success of the monopoly against all the accidents of fighting with a rival... The higher the development of capitalism, the greater the shortage of raw materials, the sharper the competition.-

3 Ibid., p. 359.

4 Cit. by: ibid., p. 376.

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competition and the pursuit of sources of raw materials all over the world, the more desperate the struggle for the acquisition of colonies. " 5
A new trend was also the desire to capture not only already identified, but also potential sources of raw materials. Rapid technological development led to the need for new materials, fuels, etc., and discoveries that made it possible to develop sources of raw materials that were previously considered inaccessible. Hence the desire to acquire any territory as a possible object of economic use. This new view of things was reflected by the French historian J.-E. Driot: "We have to hurry: nations that do not provide for themselves run the risk of never receiving their part and not taking part in that gigantic exploitation of the earth, which will be one of the most significant facts of the next (i.e., XX) century." 6
The sharpest struggle also unfolded around sales markets. Within their own countries, monopolies sold goods at monopolistically high prices, while in foreign markets, in order to undermine competitors and establish themselves in markets, including those protected by customs duties, often at bargain prices. This even applied to the markets of "foreign" colonies, which were especially carefully protected. The competition became extremely fierce and uncompromising, for the battle involved not small, isolated enterprises, but large trusts and entire states.

To strengthen their positions in other countries, monopolies began to resort to a wide export of capital. Their first foreign branches were established mainly in the field of raw materials extraction, plantations that supply tea, coffee, cocoa beans, sugar cane, and tropical fruits to the metropolitan market. Joint Anglo-Dutch monopolies were created for the exploitation of overseas oil. Branches of foreign monopolies, particularly in the manufacturing industry, were also established in the middle-developed countries of capitalism.

With the general acceleration of growth rates, the unevenness of industrial development has sharply increased. Production grew faster in Germany, the United States, and Japan. England and France lagged behind, with the earliest monopolistic possession of their colonies, the earliest export of capital, and earlier signs of stagnation, decay, and parasitism. By the beginning of the First World War, there were five major economic regions of the world (and in today's terminology, five centers of attraction): Central European, British, Russian, East Asian, American 7 . ""We see," Lenin wrote, " three regions with highly developed capitalism (the development of communication routes, trade and industry)is strong: central European, British, and American languages. Among them are three world-dominating states: Germany, England, and the United States. The imperialist competition between them and the struggle between them is extremely aggravated by the fact that Germany has an insignificant area and few colonies... On the contrary, political concentration is very high in the British and American regions, but there is a huge discrepancy between the vast colonies of the former and the insignificant ones of the latter. " 8
This is another step forward in the process of dividing imperialism into opposing and competing factions. Moreover, the balance of power was increasingly changing in favor of Germany, the United States, and Japan. At the beginning of the century, for example, England was almost twice ahead of Germany in terms of industrial production, and by 1914-only 1.5 times. At the beginning of the century, England and Germany smelted the same amount

5 Ibid., p. 380.

6 Cit. by: ibid., p. 384.

7 See ibid., pp. 392-394.

8 Ibid., p. 393.

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In 1913, Germany surpassed England in this area by 40%. In 1900, the United States produced 1.7 times as much industrial output as England, and in 1913, it produced 2.2 times as much. 9
The strengthening of the new imperialist Powers created a sharp contradiction between the existing territorial and economic division of the world, on the one hand, and the changed balance of economic and military forces, on the other. England and France captured many colonies when they were relatively strong. They retained their colonies even at a time when they became relatively weaker economically than the countries that overtook them. The" deprived " imperialist countries demanded the redistribution of colonies and spheres of influence. The refusal of the old Powers to make" peaceful " repartition eventually led to the First World War.

There was a conflict between a certain level of development of the productive forces of the capitalist countries and the nature of the relations that had developed between them. Lenin also spoke about this: "The question arises: on the basis of capitalism, what other means could there be than war to eliminate the discrepancy between the development of the productive forces and the accumulation of capital, on the one hand, and the division of colonies and "spheres of influence" for finance capital, on the other?"10 . At that time, apparently, none.

* * *

Since the First World War was fought mainly on the territory of Europe, when describing its origins in the bourgeois and social-reformist literature, the opinion was repeatedly expressed that the real subject of the military conflict was the protection of the national sovereignty of a number of European states from the encroachments of one of the military blocs. Hence the chauvinistic, jingoistic position of a large part of the social-democrats of that time, not to mention the position of all the propertied classes.

Even the Basel Manifesto of the Second International clearly and definitely pointed out the concrete conflicts of interests that led to the war. The manifesto concluded that the war could not be "justified on the slightest pretext of any popular interest"; it was being prepared "for the profit of the capitalists and the ambition of the dynasties"11 . In the course of the war, when most of the Social-Democrats had departed from the provisions and conclusions of the Basel Manifesto, Lenin continued to consistently expose the imperialist nature of the war between the two belligerent coalitions.

Not only the agrarian and economically backward countries became the object of redistribution, but also the industrialized regions of Western Europe, such as Belgium, which Germany sought to annex, and Alsace-Lorraine, which France wanted to return. Lenin emphasized that imperialism's interest in seizing "not only the agrarian regions, but even the most industrial ones" is characteristic of imperialism at this stage of its development, " because, in the first place, the complete division of land forces us to reach out to all lands during redistribution; in the second place, competition is essential for imperialism several major powers in the pursuit of hegemony, i.e., to seize land not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the enemy and undermine his hegemony. " 12
The plans of German imperialism provided for this purpose:

9 See The economy of capitalist countries after World War II. Statistical Collection, Moscow, 1959, pp. 969, 976. Relative indicators were calculated by us (see Menshikov S. M. Sovremennyi kapitalizm, Moscow, 1974, p. 195).

10 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 396.

11 Cit. by: ibid., p. 100.

12 Ibid., vol. 27, p. 389.

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The goal was a broad expansion to the East, with large parts of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran considered the" natural zone " of German interests. If Germany had succeeded in bringing England and France to their knees, a wider redivision of their colonial empires would have been inevitable. The special interests of the United States were clearly manifested during the post-war peace negotiations. It was not only about American participation in the division of the Turkish "inheritance", i.e., about significant spheres of influence in the Middle East, but also about obtaining other concessions - and not so much from the defeated Germany, but from the weakened allies: England and France .13
Thus, the struggle for the redivision of the already divided world has created two warring coalitions of imperialist powers, "standing on a completely homogeneous class basis with their rivals and opponents!"14 . Military force was still the main means of resolving such conflicts, because none of the rivals wanted to" peacefully " give up their territories, colonies, and spheres of influence. Under these conditions, the centripetal trend was really manifested only in the creation of imperialist blocs and coalitions.

But the situation of the First World War forced bourgeois and social-democratic theorists to look for ways to peacefully consolidate the conflicting interests of capitalist countries. This was expressed more narrowly in the projects of the " United States of Europe "and more broadly in the theory of" ultra - imperialism " by K. Kautsky. The controversy around these issues remains relevant today. Kautsky raised the question of the possibility of "super-imperialism," i.e., of such a unification of individual imperialisms as would exclude war between them. According to him, "ultra-imperialism" would represent a single world trust, a phase of " general exploitation of the world by internationally united, financial capital." Kautsky saw in the international cartels the prototype of the imperialist peace agreements on the redivision of the world .15
Lenin's critique of the concept of "ultra-imperialism" has two levels. One of them concerns the analysis of long-term trends in the development of capitalism. From this point of view, a phase of "ultra-imperialism" and a single trust, "internationally united finance capital", in which there are no internal contradictions, no struggle and conflicts in all possible forms - such a phase of "peaceful" imperialism is impossible and unreal. The second level of criticism is the question of temporary agreements and alliances of the imperialist Powers. Lenin's answer to this is unequivocal: this is not a question of theoretical possibility, but of concrete reality. Actual examples of such unions, in particular, for the "peaceful" division of colonies and semi-colonies, were also available in the history of the first two decades of the XX century. But the unevenness of development made such alliances fragile and short-lived, and even within them, friction, contradictions, and conflicts of all kinds were not eliminated .16
As an example of a possible union, Lenin pointed to the "United States of Europe", whose projects were then carried around by political figures of various kinds. Lenin considered such a temporary agreement of the European capitalists possible in order to "jointly crush socialism in Europe, jointly protect the looted colonies against Japan and America." 17 But at the same time, acute contradictions between the participants would not be eliminated, because the uneven development led to

13 See. History of Diplomacy, vol. 3, Moscow, 1965.

14 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 27, p. 94.

15 See ibid., pp. 391, 415.

16 Ibid., pp. 416-417.

17 Ibid., vol. 26, p. 354.,

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this would lead to a drastic change in the balance of forces between them. Lenin admitted the possibility of imperialist alliances in various forms: "Whether in the form of one imperialist coalition against another imperialist coalition, or in the form of a general alliance of all the imperialist powers," but he considered such alliances only "respites" between wars. "Peaceful alliances prepare for wars and in their turn grow out of wars, conditioning each other, giving rise to a change in the forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle from the same soil of imperialist ties and relations between world economy and world politics."18
This is the dialectic of Lenin's approach to the correlation of centripetal and centrifugal forces in the world of imperialism. Moreover, it was important to conclude that in the conditions of a military clash between the imperialist powers, their mutual hostility can prevail over the general class interests of the world bourgeoisie and create favorable external conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution in one, separately taken capitalist country. Of course, the possibility of such a victory follows from the totality of processes included in the law of uneven economic and political development of capitalism .19 But the situation of the First World War made it impossible to immediately unite imperialism to suppress the October Revolution in Russia.

* * *

The emergence of the world's first socialist state had a twofold impact on the internal contradictions of capitalism. A fundamentally new socio-political system has transformed from the slogan and demand of the exploited class into an international reality. The loss of a huge country from the sphere of influence of imperialism objectively contributed to the aggravation of inter-imperialist rivalry, as the territory for redistribution between imperialist groups narrowed. At the same time, class hostility to the new state and fear of the possibility of socialism spreading to other countries for the first time became the most important factors determining the general direction and specific features of the policy of the capitalist powers.

Since that time, the problem of correlation between two types of international contradictions has arisen: between countries with different social systems and between countries of capitalism. In general theoretical terms, it is obvious that the conflict between socialism and capitalism is deeper, because it reflects a whole historical period of global transition from one socio-economic formation to another, the change of the political rule of the exploiting class by the dictatorship of the proletariat, and then by a classless society. The antagonism between opposing classes cannot but be deeper in its essence than the inter-imperialist struggle in which representatives of the same class who have similar, though conflicting, interests collide.

But this does not mean that the contradictions between the two systems should always be sharper than the contradictions between the capitalist Powers. And it is all the more wrong to assume that if there is a global contradiction of a higher, social - class order, then it is precisely this contradiction that generates interstate conflicts, then

18 Ibid., vol. 27, pp. 417-418.

19 See ibid., vol. 26, p. 354.

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how the rivalry of imperialist countries recedes into the background, loses its conflict character. The experience of the Second World War shows the opposite. Awareness of this truth underlies the conclusion about the possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems. Peaceful coexistence is an internal necessity of socialism. Socialist states, as a rule, are born in difficult conditions and need a long peaceful coexistence with capitalism. This is necessary in order to build a socialist society. The need for peace permeates the foreign policy of the socialist States in the subsequent period of their existence.

The historical and fundamental advantages of socialism are best revealed precisely in the conditions of lasting peace.

In a socialist society, there are no classes or social groups that are materially interested in war, in enriching themselves through war. Communists are also alien to the idea of " exporting the revolution." Socialism cannot be exported; it is prepared by the internal development of each individual country. Moreover, the existence of deep class and ideological differences between the two systems should not hinder the normal development of relations with the capitalist countries. The ideological struggle should not extend to interstate relations. Such were Lenin's instructions regarding the international activities of the U.S.S.R. 20 Therefore, it is natural that from the very beginning the foreign policy of the socialist state was aimed at normalizing relations with the leading capitalist countries, at developing mutually beneficial cooperation with them in various fields. This circumstance played a huge role in the alignment of international forces in the 20-30s, especially in the run-up to World War II.

The ideologues of imperialism have repeatedly put forward calls for class anti-communist unity, as well as repeated attempts to implement this slogan in concrete policies. This was already evident in the first years after the socialist revolution in Russia, when joint efforts were made to overthrow the Soviet government, and when military intervention was organized against it by a number of powers. In the 1920s, the same line manifested itself in the creation of a "cordon sanitaire", and in the 1930s-in the signing of the "anti - Communist pact", in the policy of appeasement of the aggressor and in the attempts of the Western powers to "channel" the expansion of the most aggressive forces of imperialism against the USSR .21
All these attempts failed. For the most part, the capitalist countries that experienced a new long period of deep economic crisis difficulties in the 1920s and 1930s were economically interested in cooperation with the socialist country rather than in war with it. And on the eve of a new world War, inter-imperialist rivalry for the redistribution of territories objectively proved stronger than the attempt to create a "general imperialist front" against real socialism. In the second half of the 1930s, inter-imperialist rivalry once again led to the split of the capitalist world into two warring coalitions, and a new world war between them.

20 See: History of Foreign Policy of the USSR, 1917-1980. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1980; Petrovsky V. F. Bourgeois foreign policy concepts and ideological struggle in the international arena, Moscow, 1977; Sanakoev Sh. P., Kapchenko N. I. Foreign Policy and the Struggle of Ideas, Moscow, 1981.

21 See Solov'ev O. F. International Imperialism-the Enemy of the Revolution in Russia, Moscow, 1982.

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* * *

Lenin's analysis of the origins of the imperialist war as a war for the redivision of the world in its methodological part can also be applied to the Second World War. What was new here was that one of the two rival blocs (the American - British one) became, in the course of the war, an ally of the socialist state in the struggle against the other imperialist bloc. In their deep socio-political essence, both blocs were closer to each other than to the Soviet Union. But in terms of their real economic and strategic state interests, Britain and the United States were at that time closer to the USSR than to the Berlin - Rome - Tokyo bloc.

Germany and Japan not only sought a territorial division of the world, but also set as their goal the conquest of joint world domination. Germany sought absolute domination in Europe and the transfer of all other European countries to the position of its satellites, colonies and occupied territories. This also applied to such imperialist countries as Britain and France, not to mention their African and part of their Asian colonies. Japan fought for the possession of most of Asia and the Pacific basin, which meant capturing all the colonies and semi-colonies of England, France ,and the United States there. 22 The only question that did not arise at this stage was the conquest of the United States, but it would inevitably arise later if the Axis countries had succeeded in achieving their primary goals.

There were other significant new elements that defined the character of World War II .23 The situation was different from the First World War, when, according to Lenin, there was no threat of loss of sovereignty for either Russia, France or England, but only the redistribution of small countries in Europe, partly in Asia. "The real essence of this war is not national, but imperialist," Lenin wrote at the time .24 The Nazis wanted to reduce the USSR, France, and England to the position of their colonies.

Under these conditions, a military alliance with the USSR was objectively necessary for Britain and the United States, since this created a real opportunity for them to defeat Germany, and mainly by someone else's hands. Of course, the ruling circles of Britain and the United States thought most of all about preserving and expanding their own colonial sphere, about preventing the strengthening of the international position of the USSR. With the attack on the Soviet Union, Germany temporarily postponed the implementation of the immediate goal of capturing England. But W. Churchill and F. D. Roosevelt understood that if the USSR fell, it would be the turn of England, and then the United States .25
The threat from Germany and especially Japan to the colonies and some of the direct spheres of influence of American capital was more than real. Japan occupied the Philippines. Germany was eager for Middle Eastern oil, and wanted to establish itself in Mexico and other Latin American countries. The United States understood that its position as an imperialist Power would be undermined if Germany and Japan won. But no less important was the other side

22 See. History of Diplomacy, vol. 4, Moscow, 1975.

23 See. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1973, pp. X-XI; vol. 3. Moscow, 1974, pp. 6-8.

24 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 30, p. 83.

25 See: Sevastyanov P. P. Before the Great Test. Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1981; Zemskov I. N. Diplomatic history of the Second Front in Europe, Moscow, 1982. ,

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affairs. In the event of a victory over Germany and Japan, the United States could advance to the position of indisputably the first imperialist power in terms of strength, as a result of weakening all other competitors and rivals, without exception. The United States then sought to receive under its de facto guardianship a significant part of the most valuable colonial inheritance of England and France. The Atlantic Charter of 1941, which served as the fundamental basis of the American-British alliance, stipulated freedom of access to sources of raw materials. Of course, these tasks were achieved by the United States with relatively little blood, because the main "work" was done and the victims were borne by other countries, primarily the Soviet Union. So, both the immediate and more distant goals of the United States in the war were mainly imperialist.

The origins of the Second World War cannot be revealed without taking into account the specific socio - economic situation of the 20s and especially 30s in the world of capitalism. This was a period of prolonged crises and depressions, sharp aggravation of class antagonisms and the struggle for markets. The technical base of the industry with its huge and growing demand for mineral raw materials and fuel remained the same. The redistribution of raw material sources made in the 1920s was entirely in favor of England, the United States and France. At the same time, Germany and Japan were deprived. Inter-imperialist rivalry became extremely acute in the conditions of the deepest crisis of the 1930s. Pressed by Germany and Japan in the markets, England abandoned free trade and increased preferential barriers in its colonies and dominions. Overprotectionism and dumping became universal phenomena, and the capitalist world broke up into currency blocs. Even so, the balance of economic forces was constantly shifting in favor of Germany and Japan .26
The specifics of the internal development of capitalist countries also affected. In the context of long and deep economic crises, the growth of state - monopoly capitalism accelerated. But its preferred orientation was different. The crisis contributed to the development of extreme militarism and reaction, which took the form of fascism in Germany, Italy, and practically in Japan. The total militarization and suppression of bourgeois democracy at home, the policy of open aggression in the external arena, and aggression with global goals and under racist slogans-all this gave a special, far-reaching character to the plans of German and Japanese imperialism.

This direction of the social and political development of the Axis countries was one of the main factors that created a common goal of the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition, which included the socialist and capitalist states. The struggle was waged against fascism, and not just for national independence, which united in one alliance the most diverse class forces and political parties. This was a political reality that the ruling circles of the United States and England could not ignore.

Consequently, on the one hand, the inter - imperialist contradictions turned out to be stronger than the anti-communist class community of the imperialist states; on the other hand, the anti-fascist community of various political forces in a number of capitalist countries turned out to be stronger than the anti-communist and anti-Soviet class community of their bourgeoisie and other ruling strata.

26 By the beginning of the Second World War, Germany had almost equaled Britain in terms of industrial output, surpassing it in terms of heavy industry output (Ekonomika kapitalisticheskikh stran, p. 977; see also Menshikov S. M. Uk. soch., p. 195).

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* * *

The results of the Second World War were generally unexpected for imperialism. Its position in Europe and Asia was dramatically weakened as Germany and Japan were defeated. The power of the Soviet Union has increased. Socialism as a socio-political system has spread to a new, vast territory. Under these conditions, the reaction of the imperialist Powers to the growth of world socialism was the creation of their class-based economic, political, and military alliance. The Fulton Speech of Churchill in 1946, the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Marshall Plan in 1948, and finally the creation of NATO in 1949-these are the stages of the formation of this alliance .27
The sharp weakening of Britain and France predetermined the undisputed leadership of the United States in this alliance. Along with the military sphere, where the US had an overwhelming advantage, its hegemony was also reflected in the de facto monopoly in the export of capital and international credit, in the collapse of the old cartel agreements, in which England and Germany had strong positions, in the creation of the Bretton Woods currency system, which consolidated the dominance of the dollar, and so on .28
Colonial empires also began to disintegrate. The old colonial Powers were no longer able to maintain power in their possessions by military means. Unsuccessful colonial wars exhausted the financial forces of the metropolises. Gradually, they were forced to lose their colonies, while at the same time they tried to maintain neo-colonialist ties and dependencies. The old imperial form of organization of the world economy was clearly collapsing. The main role here was played by the rise of the national liberation movement. The process of disintegration of the colonial system was also facilitated by the weakening of the mother countries-England and France. By launching a broad economic expansion, the United States became the main exploiter of the former colonial periphery .29
Thus, the class alliance of the imperialist Powers was carried out on an unequal basis, i.e., practically under the dictates of the United States. Talk of the need for "class unity" in the face of "communist danger" was intended to mask the subordination of competitors and the imposition of a system of sole rule by American imperialism. The late 40s and early 50s were the period of the greatest development of US hegemony in the capitalist world.

But the muffled centrifugal forces gradually began to revive. The economic situation also contributed to this. The scientific and technological revolution that unfolded in the 1940s and 1960s did not free the economies of industrially developed capitalist countries from dependence on raw materials, but it did somewhat change the nature of the latter. Although the demand for steel remained high, the age of its absolute predominance was coming to an end. The use of aluminum increased enormously, and coal was actively replaced by oil. Synthetic materials reduced the need for natural raw materials 30 . This contributed to a decrease in interest in those colonies that were suppliers of rubber, cotton, jute, etc.

27 See. History of Diplomacy, vol. 5, book 1, Moscow, 1974.

28 See: Lemin I. M. Anglo-American contradictions after the Second World War, Moscow, 1955; Menshikov S. M. American monopolies on the World capitalist Market, Moscow, 1958.

29 See: The Collapse of the British Empire, Moscow, 1964; Antyasov M. V. Pan-Americanism: Ideology and Politics, Moscow, 1981.

30 See: Energy crisis in the capitalist world, Moscow, 1975; Raw material crisis of modern capitalism (World economic aspects), Moscow, 1980; Grigoriev A.D. USA: scientific and technical progress and the use of industrial construction materials, Moscow, 1972; Khvoynik P. G. Mezhdunarodnaya kapitalisticheskaya torgovaya, Moscow, 1977; Rymalov V. V. Strukturnye izmeneniya v world Capitalist economy, Moscow, 1978.

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For some time, England and France still sought to preserve their former colonies as preferred markets for goods. But their role as a sphere for the export of capital was gradually reduced. In the first decade after the war, most of the imperialist Powers (except the United States) did not have a surplus of capital to export. Since the 1950s, as the colonies gained independence and the liberated countries took measures to protect domestic production, the political climate for foreign investment here has worsened. In the 1960s, more than two-thirds of the export of capital from the United States and Western Europe was directed to countries with high and medium development of capitalism .31
The scientific and technological revolution has increased the spasmodic development of imperialist states. Production grew most rapidly in the defeated countries-Germany and Japan, which were least burdened with military expenditures and where the resources of accumulation could go almost exclusively to modernize and create a new production apparatus. In the 1960s, France also accelerated its industrial development. Production grew more slowly in the United States and England.

The competitive position of the United States in world markets was weakened by significant military expenditures and large expenditures on capital exports. By the end of the 1950s, the share of the United States in the global economy had significantly decreased. Thus, their share in the industrial production of capitalist countries decreased from 50% in 1948 to 43% in 1958, and their share in total exports-from 33% in 1947 to 21% in 195732 . But at the time, it wasn't a big concern in the US. Individually, each of the competitors was still far behind. The dollar still held a dominant position, and the US gold reserve was still significant. The predominant position of the United States in the export of capital was not disputed by anyone.

Since the late 1950s, economic integration in Western Europe has become a new factor in the balance of power. From the point of view of inter-imperialist contradictions, integration is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. First of all, for the first time in history, the leading capitalist countries of Western Europe have united to strengthen their positions in competition with the United States and Japan. The markets of the European countries themselves were divided and a common external customs barrier was created against the most dangerous competitors for the European Economic Community. The elimination of customs duties within the "Common Market" spurred the process of intertwining the capital of Western European monopolies, contributed to the unification of enterprises and firms, the establishment of specialization and cooperation. Thus, the foundation was created for the formation of trans-European monopolies - more powerful than the previous monopolies in individual countries. Secondly, the "Common Market" agreements provided for the admission of Germany to the neocolonial spheres of influence of other Western European states (in particular, to the markets of African countries). At the same time, integration was aimed at strengthening the position of capitalist Western Europe in its relations with socialist Eastern Europe, as well as consolidating the general class positions of the monopolistic bourgeoisie of Western Europe in the struggle against the working class.

Integration helped to maintain relatively high production growth rates in Western Europe in the 1960s and strengthen its position on world markets, primarily at the expense of the United States. If in 1958 the Western European countries combined accounted for

31 Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye ekonomicheskie otnosheniya [Modern International Economic Relations], Moscow, 1964, pp. 300-301.

32 Menshikov S. M. Sovremennyi kapitalizm: ot krizisa k krizisu [Modern Capitalism: from crisis to Crisis]. Moscow, 1981, pp. 142-143.

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If the total exports of the capitalist countries were 42%, then by 1973 their share had increased to 51%. At the same time, the share of the United States decreased from 21% to 14% 33 . If initially Western European countries achieved success in the "Common Market" itself, then by the end of the 60s they are increasingly penetrating the US domestic market. Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s, it was possible to state with certainty the creation of a second center of imperialism competing with the United States - the coalition of capitalist powers of Western Europe .34
Within the framework of the imperialist alliance under the auspices of the United States, there was also a revival of Japanese imperialism. Japan, deprived of its colonies as a result of the war, had to adapt to the new structure of the world economy, develop completely new industries for itself. Japanese monopolies, with the help of the state, have focused on borrowing and mastering foreign, primarily American, technology. Japan's rapid foreign trade expansion was unfolding. Strong relationships were established with markets and suppliers of raw materials in Southeast Asia and other Pacific countries. Over time, Japanese concerns have penetrated far beyond the borders of this region, and their expansion has become global. Japan began to successfully overcome the customs barriers of the United States and the "Common Market". By the beginning of the 1970s, it ranked second in the capitalist world in terms of industrial production, surpassing Germany and other Western European countries35 . This is how the third center of modern imperialism, which competes with the other two, was formed.

The formation of three centers of attraction instead of the one that existed in the first years after the Second World War took place in a stubborn economic struggle, but without the use of military methods. The United States has not used its superior military strength to limit the expansion of competitors. The clashes were more about markets than sources of raw materials: the monopolies of the United States and, to some extent, England still dominated the control of raw materials.

The course pursued by the United States at that time can only be understood in the context of the entire world development. For American imperialism, both in this period and in the following, the main opponents were not the imperialist rivals represented by Western Europe and Japan, but the Soviet Union and world socialism as a whole. It was in their existence and in their policies that the United States saw the main obstacle to the realization of its claim to world domination. In the growth of forces of social and national liberation around the world, the US ruling circles saw the "hand of Moscow" and the "threat of communism."

Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the United States concentrated its main efforts on building up strategic and other weapons directed against the Soviet Union, on "containing" the spread of socialism to new countries, and also made direct military attempts to restore capitalism-first in Korea, then in Vietnam and other Indochina countries. The United States even helped restore the economic power of its competitors, considering them as outposts of capitalism in the struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries. For this purpose, they even went to the extent of making room in the world markets in favor of their allies. ,

33 Ibid.

34 See: Tambovsky V. Mezhimperialisticheskie protrusiviya na sovremennom etape [Inter-imperialist contradictions at the present stage], Moscow, 1972; Goncharov A. N. Voina, which does not Stop, Moscow, 1975; Baklanov A. G., Viktorov A.V. Europe in the Modern World, Moscow, 1982.

35 See Japan in the system of World Economic Relations, Moscow, 1977.

36 See: Kirsanov A.V. The USA and Western Europe: Economic Relations after the Second World War, Moscow, 1967. Economic relations of the USA and Western Europe at the present stage, Moscow, 1975.

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There were also economic factors that contributed to this policy of the United States. In the 60s, production growth in this country slightly accelerated compared to the 50s, and cyclical crises were weaker. The illusion of comparative economic well-being was created. The fast-growing industries of Western Europe and Japan represented a huge new additional market for the United States, especially for its agricultural and raw material exports. It is also very significant that the countries of highly developed capitalism have become the main sphere of capital export from the United States. American manufacturing monopolies bought up enterprises in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, and created new production facilities there. It was also a convenient way to bypass customs barriers (including the "Common Market"). Foreign branches of American monopolies quickly became the main area of US foreign economic expansion. In terms of the size of products sold, they surpassed the US commodity export 37 . On this basis, powerful multinational corporations (TNCs) developed, which had their headquarters in the United States and often preferred to import the products of their foreign enterprises there.

These were the objective conditions that led to the loss of American imperialism's hegemony in the economy of the capitalist world.

* * *

In the first half of the 1970s, new qualitative changes were accumulated in the development of both groups of contradictions: inter-imperialist and between the two systems. At the same time, the economic situation in the capitalist world began to change dramatically for the worse.

By that time, there was an approximate military-strategic balance between the United States and the USSR, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. This circumstance provoked a twofold reaction in the ruling circles of capitalist countries. A significant part of them were characterized by a tendency to detente and normalize relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. This trend was first apparent in Western Europe and Japan, and somewhat later in the United States. In Western Europe and Japan, this was primarily due to the desire to end the Cold War, strengthen their own security, and gain additional benefits from economic cooperation with socialist countries. For the ruling circles of the United States, detente was only an attempt to achieve a social "status quo" in the world and gain access to important new markets. 38 In general, the easing of tensions between the two systems in the 1970s objectively contributed to the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in the world of capitalism.

The second and to some extent derivative reaction was a different one, which first appeared in the United States under J. R. R. Tolkien. And then, most clearly, under Reagan, namely, the desire for social revenge on an international scale .39 This was due to the previous failures of American imperialism: the defeat in Vietnam, the creation of progressive regimes in Africa, the fear of a similar "left wave" in Central America, and the revolutions in Europe.

37 См. American Economy in Transition. Chicago - Lnd. 1980, pp. 183 - 279.

38 This is clearly seen, for example, in the memoirs of H. Kissinger (see Kissinger'H. Years of Upheaval. Boston-Toronto. 1982 (especially-chapter XXII).

39 See, for example, Ponomarev B. N. Concrete deeds for the sake of peace consolidation. - Kommunist, 1984, N 8, p, 20; Zagladin N. V. Anti-Sovietism in the global strategy of US imperialism. Moscow, 1981.

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Afghanistan and Iran. Contrary to the claims of a number of American politicians, detente had only a small impact on these processes and, of course, was not their cause. After the defeat in Vietnam, the United States hesitated for some time to openly use military force against liberation movements. But this was caused not by detente, but by the negative attitude of the American people to the colonial wars, which demanded more and more victims from them, and discredited the American military and special services. As a result of these defeats, the authority of the United States as the leader of the capitalist world fell, and the class alliance of the imperialist powers, previously united, began to reveal deep cracks. Under these circumstances, Reagan's "crusade" was also used as a way to force the allies to unite on an anti-Soviet basis, to force them to abandon detente, to follow a course of exacerbating international tensions.

As was emphasized at the April 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, imperialism is trying to carry out social revenge on the broadest front: both in relation to the socialist community, and against countries that have freed themselves from colonial oppression, national liberation movements and the working people of capitalist countries. In recent years, the coordination of imperialist actions against socialist States has increased .40
The clash of two tendencies-towards detente and towards a "crusade" - unfolded in conditions when the new stagnant state of the capitalist economy, the general decline in the pace of its development, and the prolonged structural crisis caused a sharp aggravation of inter-imperialist rivalry. The slowdown in international trade has further complicated the problem of markets. The general crisis situation has caused a new explosion of protectionism, trade and currency war. The struggle for the areas of capital application has also intensified. Now Western European and Japanese monopolies have begun to buy up businesses and set up branches in the United States. Deep contradictions have emerged between the capitalist Powers in the most important areas of economic policy, including fiscal and credit policies, as well as in the areas and methods of state regulation.

In the new environment, the United States has gone on the offensive against its competitors, seeking to halt the relative weakening of its position in the global economy .41 The United States began to apply new methods of strangling competitors: direct restrictions on the volume of their exports to the United States, attempts to extend American restrictive laws and administrative rules to foreign firms,shifting an increasing burden of military spending to allies, undermining the financial stability of competitors with high interest rates and an overvalued dollar. As a result, there was a certain stabilization of the share of the three centers in international trade; the reduction of the share of the United States in the total production and exports of the capitalist world stopped 42 .

In the early 80's, competition in the new leading areas of scientific and technological progress became more intense: microelectronics, robotics, biotechnology, etc. Western Europe's lag in these areas has put it at a disadvantage relative to the United States

40 Pravda, 24. IV. 1985.

41 The Reagan administration's foreign economic policy activation program is described in the Hoover Institution's collection of works: The United States in the 1980's Stanford. 1980.

42 Cm. Stolyarov Yu., Khesin E. Three centers of power in the economy of modern capitalism. - World Economy and International Relations, 1984, N 1 (hereinafter-MEMO).

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and especially Japan 43 . The threat of American economic colonization of Western Europe has become more real.

The economic situation was complicated by the crisis of the old international economic order. In the early and mid-1970s, American and other transnational monopolies lost direct control over some of the most important sources of mineral fuels and raw materials in the liberated countries (oil, bauxite). Limiting the arbitrariness of transnational corporations in a number of liberated countries, putting forward joint demands by developing countries to restructure their economic relations with developed capitalist states, industrialization, the development of the public sector in the economies of the liberated countries - these and other processes have limited the possibility of neo-colonialist exploitation of former colonies. Crisis processes have also affected developing countries. Production growth here has slowed sharply, and their external debt has increased dramatically. The near-chronic balance-of-payments crisis has narrowed the import capacity of these countries. It has become difficult to solve the market problem at the expense of former colonies. In the world of capitalism, for the first time, increased competition from the manufacturing industries of developing countries began to be felt. The structural crisis that has engulfed a number of major industries in industrialized countries has forced them to reduce production, shifting it partly to developing countries. This affected metallurgy, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, consumer electronics, and other usually labor-intensive and material-intensive industries. Low wages in the "third world" countries allow them to develop the very industries that are declining in developed capitalist countries.

Thus, the structure of the capitalist world economy and the nature of the international division of labor are significantly changing. Industrially developed countries specialize in knowledge - intensive industries and informatics, while developing countries-along with the former agricultural and raw materials direction - also specialize in basic heavy industry sectors. As these profound structural changes take place, the monopoly of the imperialist countries on finished products of heavy industry decreases, their monopoly on advanced machinery and technology increases, and, consequently, the dependence of developing countries on imports of the latest technology increases. Along with this, the monopoly of the imperialist Powers on credit and financial resources remains. Even petrodollars, i.e., the surplus export earnings of oil-exporting countries, were invested in other countries not directly, but through American and Western European banks. The monopoly of industrially developed countries on advanced military technology and the dependence of developing countries on the purchase of weapons from developed capitalist countries continue to play a huge role.

Against the background of crisis processes and structural adjustment of the world economy, the process of transnationalization of monopolistic capital has also developed. The concentration and centralization of capital has accelerated. Not only American, but also Western European and Japanese TNCs grew rapidly. Their interweaving began on the basis of a new, very high degree of concentration of production, which went beyond not only individual countries, but also the centers of imperialism. Thus, joint production of cars by American and Japanese concerns, aircraft engines by English, French and American concerns, and ferrous metals by American and English concerns have been established.

43 См.: Newsweek, 9.IV. 1984; International Herald Tribune, 3.IV.1984.

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44 In the 1970s, transnational banks also grew, both through the external expansion of the largest banking monopolies in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, and through the formation of international banking associations that operate in Eurodollar and other international markets that are not subject to the control of national regulatory authorities. The process of merging of TNCs and international banks and the formation of transnational financial capital and corresponding groups of financial oligarchies on this basis has intensified .45 There is a process of merging the international financial oligarchy with national capitalist states, including attempts to coordinate economic policies and state regulation of their economies. The internationalization of military-industrial complexes and their integration with transnational militarism within the framework of NATO and other imperialist military alliances is also rapidly developing .46
All these processes have strengthened the basis for developing a joint policy of the imperialist Powers, despite the sharpest competition between them. Along with official meetings and meetings of leaders of the leading capitalist powers (including within the framework of NATO), an informal mechanism for policy coordination by representatives of the ruling elite of the same states was formed (the Bilderberg Club, the Trilateral Commission, and the California meetings).47 . However, each of these forums reflects the specific interests of the financial and oligarchic groups included in them and can sometimes significantly differ in the direction of jointly developed decisions. For example, the Trilateral Commission largely reflects the views of the northeastern financial groups of the United States, in particular the Rockefeller and Morgan groups, which are traditionally closely associated with the Western European financial oligarchy and prefer coordination based on the formal equality of the three imperialist centers while recognizing American leadership.

In contrast, the California and Texas groups of the United States, which represent R. Reagan and his ministers are more focused on methods of brute pressure and dictate that correspond to the interests of the military-industrial complex, as well as provincial American industrialists who are hostile to the competition of Western European and Japanese monopolies in the domestic American market. Reagan administration's emphasis on the "crusade" against Communism-

44 See: Zharkov V. V. Club 200. Transnational monopolies: Structure and Evolution, Moscow, 1974; Pletnev E. P. Cosmopolitanism of capital and internationalism of the proletariat, Moscow, 1974; Ivanov I. D. International corporations in the world economy, Moscow, 1976; Astapovich A. Z. International Corporations of the USA: trends and Contradictions of Development, Moscow, 1978; Chibrikov G. G. The role of modern monopolies in the process of internationalization of capital and production, Moscow. 1979; Belous T. Ya. Mezhdunarodnye monopolii i vyvoz kapitala [International Monopolies and export of capital], Moscow, 1982; Medvedkov S. Yu. Transnational Corporations and the aggravation of capitalist Contradictions, Moscow, 1982; see also: Fortune, 5. III. 1984, p. 43; International Herald Tribune, 6.II.1984.

45 See: Zhelezova V. F. The Clan of 20. International Banks of the USA, Moscow, 1981; Zelenev S. B. Giants of the British business. Financial capital of England on the World Stage, Moscow 1981; Mogutin V. B. Banks and International Capitalist Business, Moscow 1981; Chernikov G. P. Internationalization of financial capital, Moscow 1982; Musatov V. T. International migration of Fictitious capital, Moscow 1983; see also: Fortune, 12. XII. 1983, p. 60; 19. III.1984, p. 60; International Herald Tribune, 19-20. V. 1984.

46 See: Tsagolov G. N. Billions for weapons. Moscow, 1981; Henry E. Za dvermi Belogo doma, Moscow, 1982; Khalosha B. M. Uk. soch., Bogdanov R. G. USA: military Machine and Politics, Moscow, 1983; Faramazyan R. A. Voennaya ekonomika amerikanskogo imperializma, Moscow, 1983; Menshikov S. M. Militarizm i sovremennaya mirovaya politika. - Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1984, No. 1.

47 See: Vorontsov G. A. Trilateral concept: theory and practice. - Voprosy istorii, 1979, N 4; Gonzalez-Mata L. M. Invisible Rulers, Moscow, 1983.

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Ma, the rallying of the imperialist powers under this slogan is an objective manifestation of the course of precisely these extremely reactionary, militaristic, aggressive groups of the financial oligarchy .48 This course meets with resistance, especially in Western Europe, because it undermines the national sovereignty of not only small but also large capitalist states.

* * *

In the 70s and especially 80s, imperialist politicians have to reckon with another powerful factor - the imperatives of the nuclear age. The military-strategic parity between two social systems in the presence of nuclear weapons indicates the impossibility of winning a nuclear war. There was a real danger of the death of civilization. Awareness of this fact by a significant part of the world's States is a relatively recent thing. It is not yet universally accepted among imperialist politicians, especially those who represent the interests of the military - industrial complex. Some of these figures, including those in the current US administration, still believe that victory in a nuclear war is possible. This is the basis of the notorious Directive No. 32, approved by the US President in 1982, "Defense Guidelines" developed by the Pentagon, accelerated modernization of the US strategic nuclear forces, plans to transfer the arms race to outer space .49
Strategic parity was a powerful factor that created deep divisions in the military policies of the imperialist Powers - the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe and the response of the socialist countries further challenged the existing military doctrines of the United States and NATO, primarily in Western Europe ,but also overseas. 50 While the United States had a significant advantage in the number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, the doctrines of "massive retaliation" and "flexible response", on which the NATO strategy is built, were not questioned. But with strategic parity, the United States ' Western European partners have serious doubts that Washington will really dare to subject its own territory to a retaliatory nuclear strike. The value of the American "nuclear umbrella" to Western Europe was thought to exist only insofar as nuclear weapons would not be used at all. But now there are growing fears in Western Europe that the real intention of the American military is to drag Europe into a so-called limited nuclear war, while remaining aloof from the catastrophe itself. Western Europeans are very attentive to any manifestations of such " nuclear isolationism "on the part of the United States. 51
48 During the last meeting of the Trilateral Commission, this antagonism of rival groups was again revealed (International Herald Tribune, 3. IV. 1984; see also: Kokoshin A. A. Behind the facade of Global Politics, Moscow, 1981).

49 Pravda, 1. IV. 1984; see also: Arbatov A. G. Voenno-strategicheskiy paritet i politika SSHA [Military-strategic Parity and US Policy], Moscow, 1984.

50 See: Vorontsov G. A. USA - Western Europe: Commonality and Contradictions at the new stage. - МЭМО, 1984, N 4; Bundy М., Kennan G., Mc Namara R., Smith G. Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance. - Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982; McNamara R. S. The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Mispercep-tions. - Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983.

51 See: Dank ert P. Speech Given by President of the European Parliament to the World Affairs Council of Boston. 2.XI.1983. -Press Release. Cabinet du President. Parlement Europeen; Tindemans L. Discours d'Ouverture du Ministre de Relations Etrangeres a la 8-e Conference Annuelle des Journalistes Europeens et Americains. Brusseles. Service de Presse, 5.IV.1984.

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They are trying to find a way out of this vicious circle by reforming NATO. It is now fashionable to improve conventional weapons in order to "raise the nuclear threshold" and make the armed forces of Western European countries capable of waging war on their own on the basis of chemical and advanced conventional weapons. But even in this case, American politicians (Rogers, Kissinger, etc.) think of a military conflict as affecting only the Old World, while the United States remains aloof, and does not risk nuclear retaliation. 52 No less suspicious are American plans for" total space defense", which, according to prominent Western European figures, will" cover " the so-called superpower, while Western Europe will be defenseless from a nuclear strike. All these discussions about the future of NATO show that the unity of the imperialist powers is now being undermined not only by their traditional mutual rivalry, but also by the desire to survive in the nuclear war planned by American strategists.

In capitalist countries, the circle of politicians who have a realistic assessment of the situation on the world stage is gradually expanding. Unlike the ideologists of social revenge, they understand the need for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, realize that in the nuclear age there is no reasonable alternative to such a course, and understand the mutual benefits of developing business cooperation with the countries of socialism. The broad unity of states and social movements that actually oppose aggressive imperialism encompasses, first of all, the socialist states, but not only them. It also includes many developing countries, especially non-aligned States. Global. the communist and workers', and now the mass anti-nuclear, anti-rocket movement in the centers of capitalism is a powerful pillar of this coalition, which includes countries with different social systems and political parties representing different classes.

Objectively, the course of the Reagan administration contributed to the growth of forces opposing the plans of American imperialism. First, this course is seen in the world as an attempt to ensure the world domination of one imperialist Power - the United States. Such a course cannot fail to arouse resistance even within the imperialist camp. The competing centers of imperialism are not ready to accept the position of junior partners of the United States. Secondly, inflaming international tensions and intensifying military preparations are considered by most States of the world as a real threat to the existence of human civilization. This is evidenced by the resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes in the UN, condemning the use of nuclear weapons first and the spread of the arms race to outer space, calling for the freezing of nuclear capabilities. These decisions were made in conditions of de facto isolation of the United States. Third, the Reagan administration's declaration of any form of national liberation movement as "terrorism", direct US military intervention in Central America and the Middle East, and Washington's proclamation of entire regions as zones of "exclusive" or "special" US interests are considered by almost all developing countries as a threat to the revival of colonialism in its worst form. It is no coincidence that the non-Aligned movement, which initially emerged as a desire of a number of countries to put themselves outside the "policy of blocs", is objectively becoming more and more anti-Western-

52 См.: Kissi nger H. A. Issues Before the Atlantik Alliance. Center of Strategic and International Studies. Washington. 13.1..1984; Abshire D. M. A NATO Resources Strategy. U. S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, 9.IV.1984.

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imperialist in its orientation. Fourth, the new round of the nuclear arms race being waged by Washington and NATO, especially the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe, has caused a powerful upsurge in the anti-missile movement, which includes broad social strata, including those who still stand in positions of support for NATO.

Contrary to the aspirations of American imperialism, there is a tendency in the world to detente, to reduce international tensions, to reduce nuclear weapons, and to have an honest and constructive dialogue between the United States and the USSR, between East and West. Sensible Western figures are greatly impressed by the USSR's initiatives aimed at easing international tensions and ending the arms race.

When assessing the prospects of relations between the imperialist powers, it would be a mistake to assume that rivalry between them can develop into a split into warring blocs or give rise to a military clash. This is contradicted by the impossibility of reviving the old colonial system, the practical cessation of the struggle for the redistribution of territories, and the absolute preponderance of the United States over its rivals in military strength. But it would be wrong not to see the objective tendencies that today, along with the attempts to unite the "class alliance against communism", contribute to the development of a deep contrast between the economic and state interests of the various centers of the imperialist system.

* * *

During its more than century-long history, the inter-imperialist struggle has passed through several stages, and its nature, degree of tension and severity have changed under the influence of numerous objective factors. These are, first of all, internal factors related to the evolution of the capitalist economy and politics: structural shifts in the economy, the ebb and flow of technological progress, the forms of organization of capitalist production, the degree of development and orientation of state-monopoly regulation, the forms of political domination of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the changing economic significance of colonies, foreign markets, the export of capital, forms of economic and territorial division and redivision of the world, the crisis and collapse of the colonial system, contradictions between the former metropolises and the liberated countries. Under the influence of a combination of these factors, the centrifugal tendencies in the imperialist system periodically increase or weaken, and the tendency to integrate, to unite in coalitions, to relatively peaceful means of resolving contradictions, to split into warring groups, to conflict-based methods of dividing the world by force comes to the fore. But the main thing is that the inter-imperialist rivalry does not subside, no matter what. Another group of factors, also mostly related to the internal development of capitalism , are the objective results of inter-imperialist rivalry itself: the uneven economic and political development of imperialist states, military conflicts between them, as well as specific and more distant plans for their expansion. Thus, the result of the competition over the post-war decades is the promotion of the United States to the position of the main power in the capitalist system, the United States uses its position for non-military redistribution in its favor of spheres of influence, markets, sources of enrichment. By claiming to dominate the capitalist world, they are trying to impose their diktat not only on developing countries, but also on developed countries.-

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but developed countries. This situation does not eliminate inter-imperialist rivalry and objectively deepens the contradictions in the capitalist camp, because it forces other imperialist countries to protect not only their markets and spheres of influence, but also their national sovereignty and state interests from the United States. Thus, the claims of one or more Powers to world domination contribute to the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in the camp of imperialism.

With the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism, the problem of the correlation of two groups of contradictions arose: the contradictions between the two social systems and the inter-imperialist struggle. These are contradictions of different order and depth. In the real historical situation, the deeper contradiction between socialism and capitalism may sometimes be less acute than the mutual rivalry of the imperialist powers, which leads to the rapprochement of states belonging to opposite systems, but jointly opposing the attempts of the most aggressive imperialist forces to establish their world domination. In other words, there is no "Chinese wall" between these two groups of contradictions, they are closely interrelated, one affects the other and can be partially resolved at the expense of the other.

A fundamentally new situation is being created in the context of the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of the death of human civilization. In this context, the United States ' calls for unity in the "crusade" against communism are very cautiously received by a significant part of the ruling circles of other imperialist countries. It turns out that for them the highest class interest now consists not so much in trying to destroy the opposite social system, but in trying to survive and prolong the existence of the capitalist system as a whole. In practice, this leads to the adoption of the principles of peaceful coexistence as the only reasonable alternative to a nuclear conflict. The deep commonality of interests of the States of the two opposing systems in limiting, reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons is increasingly recognized. At the same time, the desire for normal relations between the two systems coexists with the tendency to preserve the multipolarity of the capitalist world, to prevent the world domination of one imperialist center, and to resist the expansionist plans of the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

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